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Abstract Anonymous Certification (AC) refers to cryp-
tographic mechanisms in which users get certified from
trusted issuers, with regard to some pre-defined user at-
tributes, in order to produce presentation tokens. Such
tokens satisfy service providers’ access policies, with-
out revealing sensitive user information. AC systems are
generally classified under two main different categories:
(1) one-time show credentials that can be shown once
for avoiding their originating user being traced from one
transaction to another, and (2) multi-show credentials
that can be used many times while avoiding their orig-
inating user to be traced. In this paper, we consider e-
assessment opinion polls scenarios and propose an AC
scheme where the one-time show property is relevant
for making sure each user cannot hand in more than
one poll in order to get significant results. To mitigate
cheating, the scheme is provided with two extra pro-
cedures: attribute revocation and anonymity removal.
The correctness of our scheme, as well as unforgeabil-
ity, privacy and anonymity removal, are analyzed and
demonstrated.
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1 Introduction
Anonymous certification (AC), also known by privacy
preserving certification, allows users to prove they are
authorized to access a resource without revealing more
than they need about their identity. For example, users
can be issued with certified attributes that may be re-
quired by the system verifier, such as Older than 18,
works at IBM, or lives in the UK. When the users want
to prove that they own the right set of attributes, they
perform a digital signature based on the required at-
tributes, allowing the system verifier to check if a pre-
cise user is authorized, sometimes without even know-
ing precisely which attributes were used.
In this paper, we explore the integration of anony-
mous certification under e-assessment services, i.e., on-
line services expected to evaluate learners’ tasks. AC
can be integrated in e-assessment services, whenever it
is not necessary to fully identify the learner. For exam-
ple, when learners need to access a given course material
on a virtual learning environment (e.g., Moodle by Cole
and Foster (2007)), it should be enough to prove that
the learner comes from an allowed university and reg-
istered for the course. That way, it becomes impossible
for the learning environment to track the activities of
learners, while still granting access to the learners to
the course material.
When a learner takes an assessment, the learner’s
work can be anonymously sent to anti-cheating tools
(such as anti-plagiarism). With anonymous certifica-
tion, each tool might receive a request for the same work
without being able to know which learner wrote it, but
also without being able to correlate the requests and
decide whether they were issued by the same learner.
Under this context, we present e-PCS, a privacy pre-
serving certification scheme that is being integrated un-
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der the scope of TeSLA (TeSLA Consortium, 2016), a
H2020 EU-funded project that aims at providing learn-
ers with innovative authentication and authorship en-
vironments. e-PCS builds over the attribute-based sig-
nature scheme of previous constructions by Kaaniche
et al. (2017); Kaaniche and Laurent (2016).
The solution presented in this paper is an extension
of previous work by Kaaniche et al. (2017). As explained
below, the extension details formal threat models and
security analysis, emphasizes the support of one-time
show unlinkability property and introduces a proof-of-
concept of the proposed framework. The contributions
of this work are as follows:
1. e-PCS allows a user to show his presentation pol-
icy, based on his certified credentials, for only once
in each different poll. However, the same credential
can still be shown anonymously in another event
without being linked. e-PCS also permits a user to
prove the possession of a credential, with regards to
a presentation policy in as many polls as necessary.
2. e-PCS introduces the inspection procedure, relying
on a trusted third party that aims to remove the
anonymity of e-learners, in case of -concerns- re-
ported by the university/verifiers. For this purpose,
two main algorithms have been added namely Trace
and Judge, in order to genuinely conduct the inspec-
tion process and provide a proof of judgment.
3. we provide formal system and security models for
e-PCS framework. For instance, we discuss the re-
sistance of e-PCS against two adversaries, relying
on two different threat models. We prove that our
proposed scheme satisfies the confidentiality, the un-
forgeability, the privacy and the anonymity removal
requirements.
4. we provide an informal detailed discussion related
to prospective supported features, to enhance the
applicability of e-assessment opinion polls in differ-
ent settings. Main functional requirements include
the support of multiple issuing authorities and cre-
dentials’ revocation processing.
The e-PCS scheme has several advantages. Firstly,
it does not rely on a trusted third party (TTP) to pro-
tect users’ privacy. It inherits the privacy preservation
property from the anonymous certification procedures.
Secondly, it is a resource-saving mechanism as it does
not rely on an interactive protocol for obtaining certi-
fied credentials, thanks to the use of attribute-based sig-
natures. Thirdly, e-PCS does not leak any information
on who has participated to the poll and who has not,
and e-learners among different opinion polls are unlink-
able w.r.t. different and independent verifiers. Finally,
in order to prevent malicious actions and to mitigate to
anonymity abuse, e-PCS relies on a trusted inspection
authority responsible for revoking the anonymity of an
originating user when needed.
Paper1 organization — Sections 2 and 3 provide the
background and related work, elaborating further on
anonymous certification and the TeSLA architecture.
Section 4 presents our contributions. Section 5 discusses
the resistance of our scheme against security and pri-
vacy attacks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Anonymous Certification (AC)
Privacy preserving certification, often referred to as pri-
vacy preserving attribute based credentials (AC), was
first presented by Chaum (1985), to protect users’ pri-
vacy in transactions’ systems. Later, this promoting
idea has been formalized by Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya (2001). Since then, different concrete construc-
tions have been proposed and considered as essential
elementary units in privacy-preserving identity-mana-
gement systems. In fact, each honest user is able to
prove to a requesting service provider, that he holds
some authenticated attributes, known also as creden-
tials, obtained from authorized and trusted issuing au-
thorities.
2.1 Definitions
AC systems rely on some well identified entities. As
shown in Figure 1, three main entities are considered
as mandatory namely the issuer, the verifier and the
user, while both a revocation authority and the trac-
ing authority are optional. Indeed, in an AC system,
each user (i.e., TeSLA e-learner) represents a pivotal
entity, who aspires a privacy preserving access to re-
quested services, afforded by service providers, referred
to as verifiers (i.e., TeSLA cloud domain). Each veri-
fier imposes an access control policy, called presentation
policy, to its resources and services, while enforcing a
set of credentials that have to be owned by the users.
To do so, each user has first to obtain credentials from
a trusted issuing authority, known as issuer (i.e., insti-
tution domain). Then, he selects the appropriate infor-
mation (i.e., a subset of certified attributes) from the
credentials and shows the selected information to the
requesting service provider, under a presentation token.
To effectively generate and accurately verify presenta-
tion tokens, the most recent revocation information has
to be gathered from the revocation authority (i.e., ser-
vice within the institution domain), by the user, respec-
tively the verifier. That is, the revocation authority is
1 This paper is an extended and revised version of a former
conference work by Kaaniche et al. (2017).
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Fig. 1 AC Entities and Procedures
responsible for revoking issued credentials and main-
taining a list of valid credentials. In case of revocation,
revoked credentials will not be longer allowed to de-
rive tokens. Tracing authorities refer to auditing enti-
ties trusted by the system, which can effectively handle
user anonymity, if requested.
Unlinkability and untraceability are the most de-
sired privacy features a system should support. How-
ever, there are several cases, when they can lead to
misuse and where anonymity removal is necessary. This
type of feature is called inspection. It is the responsi-
bility of the dedicated entity referred to as tracing au-
thority to trace a presentation token when needed. The
presentation policy must specify the tracing authority
identity (i.e., tracing authority’s public key) and which
information the tracing authority must be able to re-
cover. The user creates the presentation token which
contains encrypted versions of the requested attribute
values with the required public key of the tracing. Addi-
tionally, this prover provides a verifiable cryptographic
proof that the encrypted content contains the same at-
tribute values as encoded in the certified credential.
2.2 Related Work
Privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms mainly
rely on the use of malleable signatures’ schemes and
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge protocols. Indeed,
to transform a credential, i.e., signed attributes, into
a presentation token, the user mainly has to create a
zero-knowledge proof showing that he possesses a valid
signature on a committed value over his attributes, re-
ceived from an authentic issuing organisation. Inter-
ested readers may refer to Lindell and Katz (2014) for
more details about cryptographic primitives, namely
zero-knowledge proofs and commitments schemes. Well-
known examples encompass the signature scheme by
Brands (2000), mainly inspired from blind signatures,
and the signature scheme by Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya (2001), essentially relying on the concept of group
signatures, which have been implemented in Microsoft
U-Prove by Paquin and Zaverucha (2011) and by Ca-
menisch et al. (2010); IBM (2018), respectively.
Attribute-based signatures (ABS) are considered as
a promoting cryptographic primitive for building priva-
cy-preserving authentication scheme, as suggested by
Maji et al. (2011). Each user possessing a set of at-
tributes, first obtains a secret signing key per attribute,
generated by a trusted central entity, referred to as at-
tribute authority. The user can then sign, e.g., a doc-
ument, w.r.t. a predicate, i.e., access policy, satisfied
by the set of attributes he holds. Considering different
design approaches, several ABS constructions have ap-
peared in literature. ABS schemes by Li et al. (2010);
Belguith et al. (2017); Herranz et al. (2012) propose
the requirement of satisfying access structures under
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threshold policies. Schemes by Maji et al. (2011); Zhang
and Feng (2012) propose the use of monotonic policies,
while Okamoto and Takashima (2011) propose the use
of non-monotonic policies. With regard to the distri-
bution of keys, Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini (2009);
Maji et al. (2011); Zhang and Feng (2012) propose sin-
gle authority distribution; vs. multiple authority dis-
tribution by Okamoto and Takashima (2011); Belguith
et al. (2018a). Related literature also exists on extended
schemes supporting practical features, such as attributes’
revocation and hidden access policies Xu et al. (2018);
Liu et al. (2017); Belguith et al. (2018b).
Kaaniche and Laurent (2016) propose a complete
privacy-preserving authentication system, calledHABS,
is introduced. The proposed protocol is built over the
use of a novel ABS construction. It is designed con-
sidering the following features: (i) signature traceabil-
ity, permitting to grant authorized auditing entities the
ability of identifying the user originating a given ABS-
message couple; (ii) unlinkability between different issu-
ing entities, to mitigate against colluding ABS author-
ities trying to link user requests; and (iii) mitigation
of replayed sessions, via secure timestamping. The ap-
proach, extended by Kaaniche et al. (2017); Kiennert
et al. (2017a), is the foundational scheme of the con-
tribution presented in this paper (i.e., e-PCS). With
regards to e-PCS, previous work does not support one-
time unlinkability property. The new approach also sup-
ports inspection features that comply with the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (EU 2016/679 GDPR).
GDPR introduces the new obligation of accountabil-
ity for organizations, such that each entity processing
personal data must be able to provide compliance of
auditing authorities.
E-learning systems are presented by Aı̈meur et al.
(2008); Aı̈meur and Hage (2010) as a composition of
Internet-based protocols and advanced security tools.
These tools are mainly a set of cryptographic mech-
anisms, that allow learners to perform on-line studies
while protecting their privacy. Aı̈meur et al. also sur-
vey a list of security and challenges that have to be
addressed, pointing out common threats that may harm
the privacy of learners. Solutions such as attribute-based
encryption and anonymous certification are listed as fu-
ture work in their conclusions.
Work by Gathuri et al. (2014) raises the problem of
impersonation issues in e-assessment applications. The
authors proposed to combine profile-based authentica-
tion scheme with time-stamping techniques to avoid im-
personation issues. Even though the proposed technique
is efficient in terms of computation and communica-
tion overheads, it does not fulfill privacy requirements
to assessed students. Kim and Huh (2018) study exist-
ing e-learning systems that are widely used in universi-
ties and educational institutions and suggested ways of
improving these systems’ performance and structural
problems with a view to developing novel interactive
and secure plateforms. Wu and Wu (2019) suggest a
new criteria evaluation scheme, based on candidates’
attributes identified from multiple data entries, and ver-
ified by a multi-level selection process.
3 The TeSLA Project
The TeSLA project is a EU-funded project. It ad-
dresses e-assessment challenges. E-assessments are at
the center of novel online education sectors. The goal
of the project is to offer e-learners to take remote assess-
ments, e.g., to avoid mandatory attendance constraints.
It must provide equivalent guarantees to the learners,
with respect to traditional examination scenarios in
face-to-face situations. Addressing physical attendance
constraints paves the way for significant cost-effective
learning and assessment approaches. Current achieve-
ments of the project to-date are of technological nature,
such as its modular, secure and privacy-preserving de-
sign that integrates authentication and authorship ver-
ification of learners.
From a security and privacy standpoint, the main
properties ensured by TeSLA are authentication and
authorship. Authentication aims at proving an entitys
identity to another party; authorship consists in prov-
ing the identity of the creator of a piece of work. Some
other traditional properties, in terms of confidential-
ity and integrity must be assured as well. In Kien-
nert et al. (2017b), some security and privacy aspects
of the TeSLA e-assessment system were analyzed and
discussed. In turn, the TeSLA platform was designed
to comply the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). In terms of learners’ certification techniques,
previous work by Kaaniche and Laurent (2016); Kien-
nert et al. (2017a) highlights the necessity of enforcing
privacy-preserving attribute credentials, i.e., to ensure
that service verifiers authenticate learners in an anony-
mous manner.
Privacy preserving certification schemes are power-
ful cryptographic mechanisms that provide data min-
imization cryptographic schemes, permitting users to
reveal only required information to service providers.
These schemes rely on some organizations issuing cer-
tificates for each user’s attributes in a way that users
can demonstrate possession of attributes in a series of
transactions without being linked. This property, re-
ferred to as multi-show property, has first been formerly
presented by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (2001), al-
lowing a user to unlinkably prove possession of a cre-
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Fig. 2 The TeSLA architecture. (a) Global perspective. (b) Main entities and components, in which anonymous certification (AC) is
placed as one of the instruments depicted in the figure (cf. online implementation at https://github.com/jgalfaro/mirrored-PKIPCS).
dential as many times as necessary. However, in some
applications, this reusability property is too flexible to
be useful, namely for e-voting, electronic surveys, etc.
3.1 The TeSLA Architecture
The TeSLA architecture, from a global perspective (cf.
Figure 2(a)) is comprised of several components that
may belong to two domains: a cloud-computing domain
(shared among several institutions) and the institution
system domain (one per university). Components that
belong to the institution domain (cf. Figure 2(b)) must
execute at the local infrastructure of each university
willing to make use of the TeSLA e-assessment frame-
work, while components that belong to the cloud do-
main are completely independent of the university re-
sources. The two domains do not share data unless ex-
plicitly stated.
The institution domain may contain the following
components: (a) the TeSLA E-assessment Portal (TEP),
which acts as a service broker that gathers and forwards
requests to other TeSLA components; (b) the reporting
tool (RT), that aims at gathering statistics regarding
the e-assessment activities; (c) the TeSLA instruments,
which handle authentication and authorship data from
and toward the client side.
The institution domain also interacts with already
existing virtual learning environment (VLEs), which
can be provided by using classic learning management
systems (LMS) such as Moodle (cf. https://moodle.
org/). A plugin integrated to the VLE acts as a client
side interface with the TeSLA components.
Some other tools that require integration to the
VLE, potentially executed at the cloud domain, for out-
sourcing and performance reasons, may need to send re-
quests and data to the TeSLA components at the insti-
tution domain through the same plugin. This includes
learner tools, instructor tools, and external tools. The
learner tool and the instructor tool are respectively de-
signed to take or setup e-assessments. External tools
are in charge of handling authentication and author-
ship data and sending them back to TeSLA instruments
for evaluation, e.g., in terms of the anti-cheating coun-
termeasures. In addition, a TeSLA Identity Provider
(TIP), which is in charge of handling identity details
related with learners, will finally conduct an identity
mapping that is used with all the other TeSLA compo-
nents. The communication between all the components
is secured by the TLS protocol (cf. Rescorla and Dierks
(2008)), deployed on the whole architecture with mu-
tual authentication, hence ensuring confidentiality and
integrity of every data exchange. The underlying Public
Key Infrastructure for TLS deployment and manage-
ment is fully detailed in Kiennert et al. (2017b).
3.2 Security and Functional Requirements
During the execution of e-assessment opinion polls, lea-
rners are requested to fill up several forms, including
multiple-choice answers or fill-in-the-blank fields. Ano-
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nymity shall be enforced while requesting access to the
forms. Authorized user must participate only once, i.e.,
the system must ensure double participation of learn-
ers, in order to have significant results. This anonymity-
accountability trade-off has to be resolved while defin-
ing an efficient privacy-preserving certification mech-
anism that fulfills the following security and privacy
properties. We assume the following requirements:
– completeness and soundness – completeness me-
ans that all valid access requests (originated from an
authorized e-learner) should be counted correctly,
while soundness implies all invalid access requests
(double access requests) should not be counted.
– anonymity – the e-learner must remain anony-
mous during the access request process.
– unforgeability – an unauthorized e-learner should
not be able to provide a valid proof of certified cre-
dentials to authenticate with the service provider.
– issue-show unlinkability – to preserve users’ pri-
vacy against colluding malicious entities, this prop-
erty ensures that it is unfeasible to link any informa-
tion gathered during the credential issuance phase
to its corresponding user while running the presen-
tation phase.
– one-time show unlinkability – this property pre-
vents any e-learner to respond to a specific poll
twice.
– accountability – to ensure accountability and pre-
vent anonymity abuse, it is necessary to identify the
originating user. This feature has to be carried out
by a trusted tracing authority.
– low computation and communication costs –
the proposed scheme should offer acceptable compu-
tation and communication costs, mainly for resource-
constrained resources.
4 The e-PCS Construction
We move now to presenting e-PCS, as a privacy-preser-
ving authentication scheme integrated to the TeSLA
framework as one of the authentication instruments
of the architecture. The solution extends the existing
attribute-based signature scheme by Kaaniche et al.
(2017). It incorporates a novel traceability feature us-
ing presentation tokens. The new procedure extends
the original construction by relaxing anonymity when
the identification of presentation token user is needed.
Nevertheless, and to prevent an issuing organisation to
trace the users, the extended construction incorporates
a tracing authority, i.e., a tracing authority (cf., Fig-
ure 1). Several presentation tokens should be mapped
to unique credentials, for statistical or pricing require-
ments. The PCS construction in Kaaniche et al. (2017)
is extended and adapted to support the aforementioned
features. As such, e-PCS extends PCS with four new
procedures, namely: Initialization, Issuance, Pre-
sentation and Inspection.
4.1 Overview
e-PCS relies on four procedures and eight randomized
algorithms. During the Initialization phase, two algo-
rithms, namely the Setup and KeyGen are executed by a
central trusted entity to set-up the system and generate
all entities public and private keys, respectively. Figure
3 shows the different interactions between the system
entities, and points out the main procedures and algo-
rithms:
The Issuance phase is an interactive protocol, be-
tween the user (i.e., the learner) and the issuer (i.e., the
institution domain). It involves two algorithms, called
Issue and Obtain, run by the issuer and the user re-
spectively. At the end of this phase, the issuer provides
a credential to the user, certifying the validity of the
contained attributes. Recall that each user may have
several credentials, each asserting some collection of at-
tributes. The new phase (i.e., Presentation) relies on
the requests of a user to get granted access to the re-
sources of the service provider (i.e., the get access to the
resources of TeSLA at the Cloud domain). During this
two-party interactive phase, the service provider first
sends to the requesting user the presentation policy.
It defines which proofs have to be provided, and
which information from the credential(s) have to be re-
vealed. To do so, the user checks the set of credentials
that may fulfill the access policy in order to generate the
presentation token. The verifier then checks the correct-
ness of the received token based on public parameters
provided by the issuing organisation(s).
This interactive phase includes two algorithms, Show
and Verify. Show is executed by the user. Verify is ex-
ecuted by the service provider, which must create and
send a blinded group element, denoted as M, and which
is based on a random value m. The blinded group ele-
ment is sent to the requesting user. Then, the user signs
the blinded group element by using his certified creden-
tials, relying on some selected attributes that satisfy the
presentation policy of the service provider.
The last phase relies on the execution of the Inspec-
tion procedure, which is carried by a separate and
trusted entity, referred to as the auditing authority.
The procedure relies on the execution of two algorithms,
Trace and Judge, which are required to identify the user
and give a valid proof of judgment.
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4.2 System Model
e-PCS relies on eight randomized algorithms defined as
follows:
Setup – given the security parameter ξ, this algo-
rithm generates the global public parameters params
and a pair of public and private keys (pkt, skt) for the
tracing authority.
KeyGen – given the public parameters params, the
KeyGen algorithm derives the pair of public and secret
keys for both users as well as the issuing organization
(s). The public and secret keys are noted respectively
(pkuj , skuj ) for user j and (pko, sko) for the issuing or-
ganization. Hereafter, we assume that the public pa-
rameters also include the public key of the tracing au-
thority, and all the algorithms have params as a default
input.
Issue – executed by the issuing authority, the Issue
algorithm takes as input the public key of the user pku,
a set of attributes S ⊂ S (where S = {ai}
N
i=1, N cor-
responds to the number of attributes and S represents
the attribute universe), the private key of the issuing
organization sko and the public key of the tracing au-
thority pkt. It outputs a credential C associated to the
set of attributes S.
Obtain – the user runs the Obtain algorithm to check
the consistency of the received credentials. This algo-
rithm takes as input the credential C, the private key
of the user sku, the public key of the issuing organiza-
tion pko and eventually the public key of the tracing
authority pkt. It outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, referring to
the validity or invalidity of the credentials received from
the issuing entity.
Show – the user executes the Show algorithm to gen-
erate the proof of possession of some attributes. As in-
put, the Show algorithm gets a nonce (i.e., the random-
ized message M), the signing predicate Υ , the private
key of the user sku, the user credential C and a series
of attributes S ′, i.e., subset of S ′, such as Υ (S ′) = 1.
The output of the Show algorithm is the Σ signature
(or an error message ⊥).
Verify – performed by the service provider. The al-
gorithm received as inputs m, Σ, pko (the public key of
the issuing organization(s)), and the signing predicate
Υ . The binary output of the algorithm is either 0 or
1, where 1 refers to acceptance of the given signature-
message; 0 corresponds to rejection.
Trace – executed by the tracing authority, the Trace
algorithm receives as inputs skt (the secret key of the
tracing authority), pko (the issuing public keys of the
organizations) and Σ (the signature). The Trace algo-
rithm provides as outputs the index j, which denotes
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user who signed M, regarding the proof of judgement
(̟) and the signing policy (Υ ).
Judge – it receives the following inputs: pko (public
keys of the issuing organizations), j (user index), Σ
(signature), and ̟ (proof of judgement). The binary
output of the algorithm is either 0 or 1, where 1 refers
to a valid ̟ (i.e., user j is genuinely the originating
entity behind Σ); 0 denotes the opposite.
4.3 Construction Composition
In terms of composition, we can now refine the previous
algorithms as follows:
– The Setup algorithm, which is in charge of gener-
ating the asymmetric bilinear group environments
(p,G1,G2,GT , ê), receives as input ξ (the security
parameter). ê represents an asymmetric bilinear func-
tion defined as ê : G1 × G2 −→ GT . The public
key of the tracing authority is the couple defined
as pkt = (h1, h2). The private key of the tracing
authority is skt = α. Let H be a cryptographic
hash function, the remaining global parameters of
the system are defined next:
params = {G1,G2,GT , ê, p, g1, {γi}i∈[1,U ], g2, pkt,H}
where g1, h1 = g1
α, {γi}i∈[1,U ] ∈ G1 and g2, h2 =
g2
α ∈ G2 represent the random generators built dur-
ing the Setup algorithm, where the α ∈ Zp and U
define the maximum number of attributes supported
by the system (cf. Karchmer and Wigderson (1993)
for details). Values in γi are involved in the con-
struction of the secrets associated to the attributes
ai.
– The KeyGen algorithm, which is in charge of provid-
ing the key pairs (i.e., private and public keys) to the
users and the issuing organizations. Each user ob-
tains a pair of keys (sku, pku) where pku is the cou-
ple defined as pku = (Xu, Yu) = (h1
sku , ê(g1, g2)
sku)
is the public key and sku, a randomly selected in-
teger, is the private key of the user. The issuing
organization obtains the private and public keys de-
fined as (sko, pko), where sko = (so, xo) = (so, g1
so)
(i.e; so is a randomly selected integer) and pko =
(Xo, Yo) = (ê(g1, g2)
so , h2
so).
– The Issue algorithm is performed by the issuing or-
ganization to derive the user credential, w.r.t. the
pre-shared set of attributes S ⊂ S. More specifi-
cally, S = {a1, a2, · · · , aN} represents the attribute
universe, whereN is the number of attributes. Given
the public key of the user pku, the secret key of the
issuing entity sko, and the set of attributes S, then
the Issue algorithm returns the user credential as
follows:
C = (C1, C2, {C3,i}i∈[1,N ], C4)
= (xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
] · h1
r, g2
r, {γi
r}i∈[1,N ], g1
−r)
where r is a randomly chosen integer, γi
r is the se-
cret key associated to the attribute ai and H(S) =
H(a1)H(a2) · · ·H(aN ).
– The Obtain algorithm is performed by a user that
wants to verify the consistency of the received cre-
dential. The inputs associated to the Obtain algo-
rithm are the following: C (the credential), sku (pri-
vate key of the user), pko (public key of the issuing
organization) and S (the set of attributes). Equa-
tion 1 represents the verification process associated
to the Obtain algorithm:
ê(C1, g2)
?
= Xo · ê(g
skuH(S)
−1
1 , Yo) · ê(h1, C2) (1)
– The Show and Verify algorithms are associated to
the Presentation phase, which can be seen as a
two-party protocol, as follows:
1. When the service provider receives a request from
a user to get access to a resource, the service
provider executes the first phase of the Verify al-
gorithm, in order to define the presentation pol-
icy. The presentation policy includes M = g1
m
(the randomized message), Υ (the access struc-
ture) and S (the set of attributes that have to be
revealed). Some requirements must be taken into
account. First, and to protect the construction
from replay attacks, the value of m is unique
to every authentication session. Second, the m
value is shared by all the entities (e.g., users
participating in the poll). The set of attributes
must equal the set of attributes revealed to the
verifier, i.e., SR, together with the set of at-
tributed non-revealed to the verifier, i.e., such
Poll
ID
User presentation token User one-time
proof
(U1, Σ1) (Ta
(1), Tb
(1))
IDpoll (U2, Σ2) (Ta
(2), Tb
(2))
.
.
.
.
.
.
(Uq , Σq) (Ta(q), Tb
(q))
Table 1 List of Participating Entities in the Poll
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that S = SR ∪ SH .
2. The requesting user executes the Show algorithm,
receiveing as main input the secret key of the
user (sku), the user credential (C), the set of at-
tributes S associated to both the user credential
and the public key of the user (pku), the random-
ized message M and the access structure (Υ ). The
complete process is executed as detailed in Al-
gorithm 1. The process returns the presentation
token, defined as follows:
Σ = (Ω, σ1, σ2, C
′
1, C
′
2, C
′
4, A,SR)
where Ω = {ω1, · · · , ωl} is the set of committed
element values of vector v underlying Σ, i.e., the
signature of M under Υ and credential’s items.
3. Upon reception of Σ (i.e., the presentation to-
ken), the Verify algorithm receives as input pa-
rameters pko (the public key of the issuing en-
tity), SR (the set of revealed attributes), m (the
message) and Υ (the signing policy). Based on
those previous parameters, the verifier checks
Algorithm 1 Show algorithm
1: Input: params (public parameters), S (set of attributes), C
(credential), M (message), Υ (such that Υ (S) = 1 and the
secret key of the user sku)
2: Output: Σ = (Ω, σ1, σ2, C′1, C
′
2, C
′
4, A,SR)
3: Convert Υ to a Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) ac-
cess structure (M,ρ) (cf. Beimel (1996)), such that M is con-
structed as a l × k matrix, whose rows are mapped to the
attributes in accordance to an injective function ρ;
4: Compute v = (v1, · · · , vl); such that vM = (1, 0, · · · , 0);
5: r′
R
←− Zp
∗;
6: C′1 ← C1 · h1
r′ = xo · [XusoH(S)
−1
] · h1
r+r′ ;
7: C′2 ← C2 · g2r
′
= g2r+r
′
;
8: C′4 ← C4 · g1−r
′
= g1−(r+r
′);
9: Ω ← {};
10: σ1 ← C′1;
11: C′3 ← {};
12: for all i ∈ {1, · · · , l} do
13: γ′i ← γi
r · γi
r′ ;
14: C′3 ← C′3 ∪ {γ′i};
15: σ1 ← σ1 · γ′ρ(i)
vi ;
16: ωi ← C
′
2
vi ;
17: Ω ← Ω ∪ ωi;
18: end for
19: rm
R
←− Zp;
20: A← Yo
sku
rm ;
21: for all ai ∈ SH do
22: A← AH(ai)
−1
;
23: end for
24: σ2 ← g1rm ;
25: σ1 ← σ1 · Mrm ;
26: return Σ = (Ω, σ1, σ2, C′1, C
′
2, C
′
4, A,SR)
the one-time show property. Indeed, we note that
the verifier keeps a local database logging all the
participating entities to a poll, as depicted Table
1. That is, for each participating user, the ver-
ifier saves the received presentation tokens and
calculates the following two values:
Ta = ê(C
′
1, g2) Tb = ê(h1, C
′
2)
Before checking the received signature Σj from a
user Uj , the verifier checks the validity of Equa-
tion 2:
∀i ∈ [1, q], Ta
(∗) · Tb
(i) ?= Ta
(i) · Tb
(∗) (2)
where q is the number of users that already par-
ticipated to the poll and (∗) denotes the present
verification session. The equation holds when the
user has already participated and the verification
process is aborted.
Afterwards, the verifier computes an accumu-
lator AR such as AR = σ2
H(SR)
−1
. The veri-
fier takes uniformly at random k − 1 integers
µ2, · · · , µk and computes l integers τi ∈ Zp for
i ∈ {1, · · · , l}, such that τi =
∑k
j=1 µjMi,j where
Mi,j is an element of the matrix M . It accepts
the presentation token as valid iff Equations 3,
4 and 5 lead to the following results:
ê(σ1, g2)
?
= Xoê(AR, A)ê(h1, C
′
2) · µ (3)
ê(C ′4, g2)
?
= ê(g1, C
′
2
−1
) (4)
ê(C ′1, g2)
?
= ê(σ2, A
H(S)−1) ·Xo · ê(h1, C
′
2) (5)
where µ =
∏l
i=1 ê(γρ(i)h1
τi , ωi)ê(σ2, g2
m).
– The Trace algorithm is executed by the entity associ-
ated to the private key skt, hereafter denoted as the
tracing authority. The tracing authority decrypts
the ciphertext (C ′1, C
′
4), retrieves ̟
∗ = C ′1 ·C
′
4
α
, re-
trieves the value of (uj
∗, pkj , Yuj
H(S)−1 , Xuj ) from
the issuer table and returns the validity of Equation
6.
ê(̟∗, g2) · [Xo]
−1 = ê(Xu
H(S)−1 , Yo
skt
−1
) (6)
– Finally, the Judge algorithm, based on ̟∗, verifies
the validity of Equation 6 to confirm wether the
signature Σ was created by user j.
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5 Security Analysis
We introduce the security model and discuss the resis-
tance of e-PCS to forgery and anonymity attacks. We
also discusss the support of functional properties such
as credentials’ revocation and multiple issuers’ settings.
5.1 Security Model
Our security model considers the following two types of
adversary:
– A honest but curious adversary – The adver-
sary is honest, in the sense of generating valid inputs
or outputs, during the different steps of the proto-
col, as well as performing proper computations of
the protocol. The adversary is curious, in the sense
of gaining extra data from the protocol, such as ob-
taining credentials and attributes of a given user,
or by identifying the requesting user based on the
provided presentation tokens. This adversary model
can be associated to a service provider, an issuing
entity or even a collusion between a curious service
provider in collaboration with a curious issuing en-
tity. In all the aforementioned cases, this adversary
model affects the validation of the privacy require-
ments of e-PCS, i.e., with respect to the anonymity
and issue-show unlinkability properties.
– A malicious user – This adversary model assumes
a user (or an external entity), trying to override
their rights or to attempt a one-time show attacks.
In both cases, malicious users are expected to mis-
follow the associated algorithms (e.g., by providing
invalid, falsified or non-authentic inputs).
A malicious user overriding his rights could refer
to an adversary whose attributes do not satisfy the
access policy, or he could be a revoked user. We also
consider a set of colluding users on the attributes,
who do not satisfy the presentation policy and try
to merge their attributes to authenticate and access
to the SP’s resources (i.e., TeSLA cloud domain), in
this attack model. The threat model associated to
the malicious user affects the unforgeability and the
one-time show unlinkability requirements of e-PCS.
5.2 Discussion
We prove in this section the correctness of the differ-
ent e-PCS algorithms. We also discuss the resistance of
the proposed solution with regards to the security and
privacy requirements, introduced in Section 3.
5.2.1 Correctness
Theorem 1 Correctness of the e-PCS construc-
tion — The execution of the Judge algorithm, with re-
gard the credential C of user u will always hold true iff,
for all (params)← Setup(ξ), all pair of public and pri-
vate keys {(pko, sko), (pku, sku)} ← KeyGen(params),
all attribute sets S, all credentials C ← Issue(S, sko, pku),
all claiming predicates Υ such as Υ (S) = 1 and all
presentation tokens Σ ← Show(C, sku, M, Υ ), ̟
∗ and
Obtain(C, sku, pko,S) = 1, Verify(Σ,m, Υ, pko) hold true
as well.
Proof – Theorem1 involves the completeness and sound-
ness properties associated to Equations 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.
The bilinearity feature of pairing functions guarantees
the correctness of Equations 1, 4 and 5, 6, such that:
ê(C1, g2) = ê(xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
] · h1
r, g2)
= ê(g1
so , g2) · ê(h1
skusoH(S)
−1
, g2) · ê(h1
r, g2)
= ê(g1, g2)
so · ê(g1
skuH(S)
−1
, h2
so) · ê(h1, g2
r)
= Xo · ê(g1
skuH(S)
−1
, Yo) · ê(h1, C2)
ê(C4, g2) = ê(g1
−r, g2) = ê(g1, g2
−r)
= ê(g1, C2
−1)
ê(C1, g2) = ê(xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
] · h1
r, g2)
= ê(g1
s0 , g2) · ê(g1
αskusoH(S)
−1
, g2) · ê(h1, g2
r)
= Xo · ê(g1, g2
αskusoH(S)
−1
) · ê(h1, C2)
= Xo · ê(g1
rm , (h2
so)
sku/rm·H(S)
−1
) · ê(h1, C2)
= Xo · ê(σ2, A
H(S)−1) · ê(h1, C2)
The correctness of Equation 3 is related to the com-
pleteness and soundness of the presentation token. The
verification of the token will always hold true iff Σ =
(Ω, σ1, σ2, C
′
1, C
′
2, C
′
4, A,SR) is also true, with regard
to message M and predicate Υ . The correctness of the
process relates to the computation of accumulator AR
and the disclosure of the revealed attributes in SR in σ2,
such thatAR = σ2
H(SR)
−1
, andH(SR) =
∏
ai∈SR
H(ai)
−1.
The value of σ1 can be expressed as follows:
σ1 = C
′
1 ·B · M
rm
= C ′1 ·
l∏
i=1
(γ′ρ(i))
vi · g1
rmm
= xo ·Xu
soH(S)
−1
· h1
r+r′ ·
l∏
i=1
(γρ(i))
(r+r′)vi · g1
rmm
We can now validate the correctness of the verifi-
cation process associated to the presentation token as
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follows. Let (r + r′) by denoted by R. Let the lefthand
arguments of Equation 3 by denoted by s, such that:
s = ê(xo ·Xu
soH(S)
−1
· h1
r+r′ ·
l∏
i=1
(γρ(i))
Rvi · Mrm , g2)
= ê(xo, g2) · ê(Xu
soH(S)
−1
, g2) · ê(h1
R, g2)
·ê(g1
rmm, g2) · ê(
l∏
i=1
γρ(i)
Rvi , g2)
= ê(g1, g2)
so · ê(g1
skuH(SR∪SH)
−1
, g2
αso) · ê(h1
R, g2)
·ê(σ2, g2
m) ·
l∏
i=1
ê(γρ(i)
Rvi , g2)
= Xo · ê([g1
sku ]H(SR)
−1H(SH)
−1
, h2
so) · ê(h1, g2
R)
·ê(σ2, g2
m) ·
l∏
i=1
ê(γρ(i), g2
Rvi)
= Xo · ê(g1
H(SR)
−1
, [Yo
sku ]H(SH)
−1
) · ê(h1, C
′
2)
·ê(σ2, g2
m) ·
l∏
i=1
ê(γρ(i), ωi)
= Xo · ê(AR, A) · ê(h1, C
′
2) ·
l∏
i=1
·ê(γρ(i)h1
τi , ωi)
·ê(σ2, g2
m)
Note that the last equality is simplified to
∑l
i=1 τi(viR) =
R
∑l
i=1 τivi = R·1 = R, knowing that τi =
∑k
i=1 µjMi,j .
Finally, the term ê(h1
R, g2) leads to the following ex-
pression: ê(h1
R, g2) =
∏l
i=1 ê(h1
Rτi , g2
Rvi).
The knowledge associated to skt concludes the proof,
and allowing decrypting the cyphertext, by validating
Equation 6 as follows:
ê(̟∗, g2) ·Xo
−1 = ê(C ′1C
′
4
skt , g2) ·Xo
−1
= ê([xo ·Xu
soH(S)
−1
· h1
r+r′ ] ·
g1
−(r+r′)skt , g2) ·Xo
−1
= ê(xo, g2) · ê(Xu
soH(S)
−1
·
g1
α(r+r
′) · g1
−(r+r′)α, g2) ·Xo
−1
= ê(Xu
H(S)−1 , g2
so)
= ê(Xu
H(S)−1 , Yo
skt
−1
)
5.2.2 Unforgeability
The unforgeability property captures the behavior of
a non-authorized signing entity. That is, a malicious
user attempts to provide a signed token, that can be
correctly verified by the service provider, based on the
Verify algorithm. For this purpose, a malicious user could
try (i) a credential forgery attack, trying to construct a
valid credential, or (ii) a presentation token forgery at-
tack, trying to provide a valid presentation token. The
adversary can try to gather information from previous
issuance and/or presentation sessions. The unforgeabil-
ity property is formally defined with respect to Theo-
rem 2.
Theorem 2 Unforgeability – e-PCS satisfies the un-
forgeability property, if for every PPT adversary A,
there exists a negligible function ǫ such that:
Pr[ExpA
unforg(1ξ) = 1] ≤ ǫ(ξ)
where ExpA
unforg is the security experiment against
the unforgeability property, with respect to Lemma 1,
Lemma 2 and Lemma3 introduced hereafter.
Proof – It relies on proving Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
Lemma 1 e-PCS is resistant to credential forgery at-
tacks.
Proof – Consider an adversary trying to disrupt the e-
PCS construction by forcing the Obtain algorithm to
accept an invalid credential C∗ with attributes S∗. It is
assumed that the adversary can conduct a polinomially
bounded number of queries to the Issue algorithm with
different combination of attribute and key pair sets, but
ignore the private key of the issuing organization.
Assume the adversary tries to generate a valid cre-
dential by perpetrating a forgery attack. To successfully
perpetrate the attack, the adversary must confrontate
the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption.
The assumption can be summarized as follows: given
a tuple (g, ga, gb), were {a, b}
R
←− Zp, it is not feasible
to compute gab in polynomial time. We assume now
that the adversary considers the credential element C1.
This element is a product of an accumulator over the
set of attributes of the user, the private key of the issu-
ing organization xo and a randomization of the public
group element h1. Knowing this aforementioned ran-
domization is required for deriving the remaining cre-
dential elements. Therefore, a successful forgery attack
by the adveresary would violate the CDH assumption,
hence protecting the e-PCS construction from creden-
tial forgery attacks.
Lemma 2 e-PCS is resistant to presentation tokens
forgery attacks.
Proof – For Lemma 2, we consider the following setting.
Assume an adversary is allowed to conduct a polyno-
mially bounded number of queries associated to presen-
tation tokens, for any selected signing access policy Υ
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where Υ (S) equals one. To successfully perpetrate the
attack, the adversary must provide a valid presentation
token for a valid credential C accepted by a honest ver-
ifier.
To successfully perpetrate the attack, the adversary
must confrontate the Computational Diffie Hellman (q-
DHE) assumption. The assumption can be summarized
as follows. Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of
a prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. Given
a tuple of elements (g, g1, · · · , gq, gq+2, · · · , g2q), such
that gi = g
αi , where i ∈ {1, · · · , q, q + 2, · · · , 2q} and
α
R
←− Zp, there is no efficient probabilistic algorithm
AqDHE that can compute the missing group element
gq+1 = g
αq+1 . The adversary has to violate the afore-
mentioned assumption to provide a valid presentation
token. Hence, it is atrighforward that e-PCS is resistant
to credential forgery attacks.
Lemma 3 e-PCS is resistant to collusion attacks.
Proof – Collusion attacks refer to malicious users trying
to merge their attributes and certified credentials to
provide a valid signature over SP’s access policy. We
assume that none of the malicious users does possess the
whole certified attributes that satisfy the access policy,
while their merged attributes permit to satisfy the SP’s
presentation policy.
To successfully perpetrate the attack, the adversary
must be able to generate a valid presentation token for
two key pairs (pkuj , skuj ) for j ∈ {1, 2}, and with re-
spect to a signing predicate such that Υ (Sj) 6= 1. The
same rationale used in the proof of Lemma 1 applies
here. Given the infeasibility of credential forgery at-
tacks against e-PCS, the adversary cannot override the
granted rights by conducting a collusion attack using
two different credentials. Hence, e-PCS is resistant to
collusion attacks.
5.2.3 Issue-Show Unlinkability
The issue-show unlinkability property is formally de-
fined by Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 Issue-show unlinkability – e-PCS sat-
isfies the issue-show unlinkability if no Probabilistic Poly-
nomial Time (PPT) adversary can compute a negligible
function ǫ such that:
Pr[ExpA
is−unl(1ξ) = 1] =
1
2
± ǫ(ξ)
where ExpA
is−unl is the security experiment against
the privacy property, with respect to Lemma 4 intro-
duced hereafter.
Proof The proof of Theorem 3 is straightforward after
the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 e-PCS is resistant to issue-show unlinkabil-
ity attacks.
Proof For Lemma 4, we consider an adversary who is
given two keypairs (pku1 , sku1) and (pku2 , sku2), as well
as a set of attributes S. We assume that the adversary
can conduct a polynomially bounded number of presen-
tation phases, under the role of a verifier, trying to sign
either a predicate Υ satisfied by S; or a subset of S for
two fixed credentials C1 associated to S for pku1 and C2
associated to S for pku2 . To successfully perpetrate an
unlinkability attack, the adversary is required to guess
which key pair (pkuj , skuj ) w.r.t. a related credential
Cj (and for j ∈ {1, 2}) used in the presentation proce-
dure, with respect to a fixed signing predicate Υ and
a set of attributes S. Since a new presentation token
for the same message M and the same access predicate
Υ is computed from random nonces generated by C,
both presentation tokens are identically distributed in
both cases, hence confirming that e-PCS is resistant to
issue-show unlinkability attacks.
5.2.4 One-Time Show Unlinkability
The one-time show unlinkability property is formally
defined by Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 One-time show unlinkability – e-PCS
satisfies the one-time show unlinkability if no Proba-
bilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary can compute
a negligible function ǫ such that:
Pr[ExpA
ots−unl(1ξ) = 1] =
1
2
± ǫ(ξ)
where ExpA
ots−unl is the security experiment against
the privacy property, with respect to Lemma 5 intro-
duced hereafter.
Proof The proof of Theorem 4 relies on Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 e-PCS is resistant to one-time show unlink-
ability attacks.
Proof – The proof of Lemma 5 is mainly based on the
correctness of Equation 2. Let us consider a malicious
user A that wants to participate twice to the same poll
with the same verifier.
Given two different presentation tokens Σ(1) and
Σ(2) defined respectively as Σ(1) = (Ω(1), σ1
(1), σ2
(1),
C ′1
(1)
, C ′2
(1)
, C ′4
(1)
, A(1),SR
(1)) and Σ(2) = (Ω(2), σ1
(2),
σ2
(2), C ′1
(2)
, C ′2
(2)
, C ′4
(2)
, A(2),SR
(2)).
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The verifier checks the correctness of Equation 2 as
follows:
Ta
(1) · Tb
(2) = ê(C ′1
(1)
, g2) · ê(g1, C
′
2
(2)
)
= ê(xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
] · h1
(r+r′1), g2) · ê(h1, g2
r+r′2)
= ê(xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
], g2) · ê(h
(r+r′1)
1 , g2) · ê(h1
(r+r′2), g2)
= ê(xo · [Xu
soH(S)
−1
] · h1
(r+r′2), g2) · ê(h1, g2
r+r′1)
= ê(C ′1
(2)
, g2) · ê(g1, C
′
2
(1)
)
= Ta
(2) · Tb
(1)
This also proves that the equality in Equation 2
holds with a non negligible probability if both Σ(1) and
Σ(2) values are derived from two different combinations
of credentials and the presentation tokens, i.e., if they
are linkable. This demonstrates that an adversary can-
not participate twice to the same poll, validating the
one-time show unlinkability property of e-PCS.
5.2.5 Anonymity Removal
The anonymity removal property refers to the account-
ability security requirement.
Theorem 5 Anonymity Removal – e-PCS satis-
fies the traceability property, with respect to Lemma 6
introduced hereafter.
Proof The proof of Theorem 5 relies Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 e-PCS is resistant to anonymity removal
attacks
Proof – Consider an adversary trying to perpetrate an
attack that violates the Show ↔ Verify procedure.
Assume as well that the tracing authority is unable to
trace the identity of the source presentation token. The
following two cases can be considered. First, an adver-
sary that forges a valid presentation token. Second, an
adversary who knows private key sku, i.e., an adversary
who is able to derive valid presentation tokens accord-
ing to Equations 3, 4 and 5, but failing the verification
of Equation 6 to avoid the traceability of the attack.
The first case, an adversary that forges a valid pre-
sentation token, contradicts the unforgeability property
of the e-PCS construction, already demonstrated in this
section. The second case, adversary knowing secret sku,
is also infeasible, since Equation 4 (resp. Equation 5),
C ′4 and C
′
2 (resp. C
′
1 and C
′
2) are verified while being
generated with the same randoms. If C ′4, C
′
2 and C
′
1
along with other signature Σ parameters successfully
verify Equation 3, that means that they all are corre-
lated. Hence, they cannot be falsified while satisfying
Equation 6. Therefore, we can confirm that e-PCS is
resistant against anonymity removal attacks.
5.3 Functional Requirements Discussion
Next, we discuss about two main functional properties
of e-PCS, namely multiple issuers’ settings and creden-
tials’ revocation.
5.3.1 Support of Multiple Issuers
As introduced in Section 3, the cloud domain, defined
over several TeSLA instances shared among all institu-
tions, refers to the service provider AC entity. The ser-
vice provider is responsible for authenticating different
users (i.e., TeSLA learners) w.r.t. provided presentation
tokens. Recall that a presentation token may be gener-
ated while combining several credentials, issued from
different issuers, that fulfill the SP’s access policy.
For instance, a learner may be enrolled with sev-
eral institutions, thus holding credentials issued from
each different institution. As such, the learner has to
be able to derive a valid presentation token, relying on
the combination of credentials issued from different is-
suing entities.
In case users force multiple authorities to issue cre-
dentials derived from their attributes, then different
sessions will be mapped through the public keys of
those users. The unlinkability property of the anony-
mous certification schemes between several issuance ses-
sions extended the credentials’ issuance algorithm that
to support pseudonym systems and public key mask-
ing during the issuance procedure (cf. Kaaniche and
Laurent (2016)). For this purpose, an aggregating al-
gorithm is introduced, to provide the credentials’ com-
bination feature. The added algorithm mainly relies on
the homomorphism property that permits to merge sev-
eral credentials’ elements (i.e., signed attributes) issued
from different issuing entities using different signing
keys (i.e., the private keys of different institutions).
As the main issuance phase follows the scheme by
Kaaniche et al. (2017), e-PCS can be extended to sup-
port the homomorphism property in order to ensure the
public key masking during the issuance phase. This en-
sures the support of multiple issuers’ settings, mainly
inherited from the construction in Kaaniche and Lau-
rent (2016).
5.3.2 Credentials Revocation
Credentials’ revocation is a main issue in anonymous
certification mechanisms. As detailed in Section 2, to
effectively generate and accurately verify presentation
tokens, the most recent revocation information has to
be gathered from the revocation authority, by the user,
respectively the verifier. In other words, the revocation
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authority will be in charge of conducting the revocation
of credentials previously issued to a given user. The re-
vocation authority is also in charge of maintaining the
database containing valid credentials, and disseminat-
ing this information to the remainder entities. In case
of revocation, the revoked credential will not be allowed
to derive valid presentation tokens anymore.
In order to support periodical users’ revocation, e.g.,
induced by the necessity of accepting systems’ appli-
cations deadlines, e-PCS considers the introduction of
a validity attribute. The validity attribute has to be
signed by the issuing entity and involved in the user’s
credential. This information is later requested by the
verifier and has to be included in the presentation to-
ken provided by the user.
6 Conclusion
We have detailed an anonymous certification scheme for
e-assessment services called e-PCS. Anonymous certifi-
cations are cryptographic mechanisms that allow users
to obtain certified credentials for their attributes from
trusted issuers. Later, users can derive presentation to-
kens that reveal only the required information, while
satisfying service providers’ access policies.
The scheme presented in this paper guarantees the
use of one-time show credentials, i.e., credentials that
can be shown only once. The goal is to avoid that the
originating user ends being traced from one transac-
tion to another (i.e., as happens in multi-show cre-
dential schemes, in which users can use their creden-
tials multiple times, hence allowing tracking and pro-
filing of users). Under this context, e-PCS considers e-
assessment opinion polls scenarios, in which one-time
show properties are relevant to avoid tracking of e-
assessment learners. To mitigate cheating, the scheme is
provided with two extra procedures: attribute revoca-
tion and anonymity removal. A detailed security anal-
ysis has been conducted, to prove the correctness of
our scheme, as well as some other properties, such as
unforgeability, privacy and anonymity removal.
The features of e-PCS allow e-assessment systems
to perform privacy-friendly access control, in order to
certify that users are allowed to access a resource be-
cause they own some attributes required by the veri-
fier, without revealing their identity. Given traditional
assessment principles, where learners receive personal-
ized grades through identity validation, anonymous cer-
tification can be applied as a complement of hosting
course material of the e-assessment system not need-
ing the true learners identity to decide whether they
should have access to the course material or not. The
system can require non-intrusive information, such as
whether the learner is enrolled at the university giving
the course, or whether the learner has registered for
the course. These two items correspond to the two at-
tributes that would be checked in the context of anony-
mous certification. By doing so, we exclude the techni-
cal possibility to track the learners’ activity, as well as
to exclude the profiling of learners according to their
hours of activity, the frequency of their access to the
course material, etc., hence significantly improving the
learners’ privacy.
Another way of integrating e-PCS into e-assessment
systems is its addition in the broker of privacy filters as
a post processing filtering tool for completed e-assign-
ments. After a learner takes an e-assessment, the as-
signment is sent to various external e-assessment in-
struments associated to the list of privacy filters, in-
cluding some anti-cheating post-processing tools (e.g.,
to check whether an assignment contains plagiarism). If
the assignment is sent along with the identifier (or the
pseudo-identifier) of the learner, it becomes technically
possible for the system to keep track of a learner’s data
over time. In the case where e-PCS is used instead, re-
lying on the aforementioned attributes, it becomes im-
possible for instruments to perform such tracking and
correlation, hence enhancing the learners’ privacy.
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